---
title: "Verify an artefact | Rotascale"
description: "Check the signature on any signed RotaGrant artefact — evidence pack, conformance claim or revocation drill — in your browser, without uploading it to us."
url: https://rotascale.com/verify/
---

Verify

# Check it here. Do not send it to us.

Paste any signed RotaGrant artefact. The signature is verified **in your browser** — nothing is uploaded, and nothing about this page needs to be trusted for the answer to mean something.

A page that asked you to send us a document so we could tell you whether to trust us would be arguing against the product it sits on.

Verify Load a real refusal Example: our demo's key

## Verifying something a customer's deployment produced

This is the ordinary case: RotaGrant runs in the customer's environment and signs with **their** key. We did not sign it and cannot vouch for it — which is the design working rather than a limitation. A vendor who could vouch for every customer's evidence would be a vendor whose customers' evidence depends on that vendor still existing.

### It is a keypair, and the public half is small

- **The private key signs**: 32 bytes that never leave the organisation's environment. It is never uploaded, pasted, downloaded or exported — the capability is absent from the interface rather than present and forbidden, and no route on the API could carry one.
- **The public key verifies**: 32 bytes — **44 characters** of base64, like `eHOPK3qP8zw5ii3tPKzZBC/ghbmD3fyiV17pZ1RnMns=`. It cannot sign anything, so it is safe to email, print in an engagement letter, publish on a website, or read down a telephone.
- **Once, then forever**: An auditor who has that string can verify *every* artefact that deployment ever signs — offline, with no call to the customer and no call to us. Neither of us needs to be reachable, or solvent, for last year's evidence to still check out.

### The only part that needs care

The key must reach you by a **different route than the document**. Every artefact embeds its own public key, and checking against that proves the document is internally consistent — but a forger can generate a keypair, sign a fabrication with it, and embed the matching public half. It would verify perfectly against itself.

So: ask the organisation for their key, or for the URL where their deployment publishes it — every one serves it unauthenticated at `/.well-known/jwks.json`. Match the `kid` there against the `key_ref` printed in the artefact. Airgapped deployments are no harder: nobody needs to reach the instance, because 44 characters travel by email.

**Ask what custody the key was under**, and every artefact answers. A key held on the deployment means the operator *could* have re-signed a rewritten history; a customer-held or HSM key means they could not. The difference is stated inside the signature as `custody`, so removing it breaks the check.

## What a passing check does and does not tell you

- **It does tell you**: That the document has not been altered by so much as a character since it was signed, and that whoever held the private key signed exactly these bytes — including the disclaimer, which is inside the signed payload rather than beside it.
- **It does not tell you**: That the claims inside are true of the world. A signature establishes integrity and origin. Whether an agent's record accurately describes what happened is a different question, and no signature answers it.
- **And whose key it was**: If you verified against the key inside the document, you proved internal consistency and nothing about identity — anyone can sign anything with a key they generated. Pin a key you obtained out of band and the check answers *who*.

The verification contract is printed inside every artefact, in its own `how_to_verify`: remove `signature` and `content_hash` from the `seal`, re-serialise the whole document using canonical JSON — sorted keys, no whitespace, UTF-8 — then verify the Ed25519 signature over exactly those bytes. Everything else in the seal is inside that signature, including the statement of who held the key. Anyone can implement it; this page is a convenience, not an authority.

[How Evidence](https://rotascale.com/platform/evidence/) [Get one Download a pack](https://demo.rotascale.com/packs) [Read Specification](https://rotascale.com/spec/)
